Intervention in the affairs of foreign countries is one of the most important tools of Iranian foreign policy to extend the state’s control and influence in those nations by all means possible; this policy is adopted in pursuit of a millennia-old goal, the ‘Persian Empire project’, which is an age-old Iranian nationalist dream pursued by regimes past and present, despite their wildly varying nature of the rulers’ doctrines.
The Islamic Republic of Iran is one of the states neighbouring the great Arab region on its eastern flank, but the ties between Iran and the Arab nations are not limited to geographical proximity, extending to trade and cultural relations and also reaching the level of sporadic military conflict.
Iran’s geography has played an important role in the historical conflicts in the region, forming a plateau bordered on most sides by towering mountain ranges; Iran was also a key patron of Western interests, especially U.S. ones, before the February 1979 Revolution.
Whilst Tehran’s regime, its strategies, and even its alliances have changed dramatically in the four decades since the 1979 revolution, the rulers’ supremacist ultra-nationalist rhetoric has been constant targeting all external powers, even as Iran emerged as an effective and competitive power at the regional and global levels.
The leadership’s revolutionary discourse and hardline Shiite doctrine both played pivotal roles in shaping the foreign policy of Iran’s new regime after 1979, while it worked constantly to infiltrate neighbouring nations and blocs in an effort to expand the gains of the revolution and to open new fronts to achieve its expansionist objectives.
Iran’s regional interventionism is not merely a result of the revolution at the end of the 1970s, however, but is rooted in the early 17th century following the attempt by rulers during that period to occupy Bahrain (1), which they subsequently withdrew from after reaching an understanding with the then-British Empire.
Iran’s adoption of a theocratic political ideology based on the ideas and beliefs of Ruhollah Khomeini, the first guide of the Islamic revolution, has led to increased international concern over Tehran’s growing influence, especially as the new Persian state keeps its heavily sectarian nature firmly at the forefront of Iranian thought. (2)
Iran’s foreign interventionism regionally is determined by the regime’s current methodological policy stance towards the Middle East, according to which the Iranian plateau is the starting point for an expansionist ultra-nationalist project promoting the regime’s hardline Persian Twelver Shiism, using both Persian and non-Persian tools and strategies to create a new regional order free of American and Israeli presence and of any regional rival, with the entire Mashreq region placed under Tehran’s rule.
In recent years, particularly with the regime collapses, changes and conflicts that followed the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011, Iran has become an active threat to the Arab region, seeking to secure its strategic interests within neighboring countries, particularly Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and Bahrain, either by military intervention or by supporting loyalist armed terrorist groups, as well as backing influential figures in the inner circles of the regional regimes.
The objectives of Iranian interventions and expansionist attempts to increase its sphere of influence vary according to the fluid political and geopolitical situations within some of these countries. For example, Iran continues to support Bashar Al-Assad’s regime in Syria militarily and economically in order to exploit the entire Syrian crisis as leverage in negotiating the nuclear file.
Iran’s regime also follows the same pattern in Yemen through sponsorship of the Ansarullah group, the Houthis, who follow the same hardline Ithna-Asheri Shiite doctrine as Tehran. The regime also wishes to pursue greater interventionism within neighbouring countries in the Arabian Gulf, all of which have a percentage of Shiite members of the population.
Research’s problem and methodology
Iran tries to play a regional role in neighbouring Arab countries through the deployment of various tools and strategies. In recent years, Iran has been calculatingly escalating and increasing its influence in the region, leading to numerous problems, with all the regional nations well aware that the regime is working to achieve its longstanding expansionist, imperialist project of regional domination, this time in an ultra-nationalist sectarian theocratic form.
The research methodology used here focuses primarily on a historical analysis of the reasons for Tehran’s persistent aggressively supremacist rhetoric and behaviour towards neighbouring Arab nations in recent decades and up to the present day, as well as the factors leading to Iran’s direct intervention in the region, the reality of its regional interests and the extent to which it has achieved the Iranian expansionist project.
Importance of study
The importance of this study stems from the urgent nature of the subject matter, especially given its current nature and its immense regional and international significance in a period of seismic regional and global changes. The study is also crucially important in addressing a pivotal issue affecting our contemporary Arab reality concerning the nature of the policies of an ancient neighbouring geographical entity.
Intervention: A term used in a general sense to express the action of a state by which it deals, in any way, with an issue within the jurisdiction of another state.
In international law, ‘intervention’ is described as the challenge by a state to another state through handling its internal and external affairs without any legal basis. The purpose of such intervention, therefore, is an effort by the aggressor state to impose a policy on the targeted state or to force it to follow a certain order concerning one or more of its own affairs.
According to international law, there are several forms of intervention, which are summarised as follows:
Political interference: Through demands imposed by the intervening state, either formally or informally, or by summoning the targeted state to a conference (i.e. the victorious Allied powers summoning Germany to the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919).
Intervention by states collectively against another state: Such intervention would be in relation to the interests of the community, such as a decision by the UN General Assembly or the Security Council against a state violating UN resolutions. (3)
This research study is divided into two chapters, as follows:
First: ‘Iran’s foreign policy towards the Arab neighbourhood’ concerning Iranian foreign policy towards the region as a whole and the dimensions of the Iranian project in the region.
Second: ‘The nature of Iran’s supremacist rhetoric towards the Ahwaz region’ regarding the offensive images and caricatures used to depict Arab characters in modern and historical Iranian literature and culture, as well as Iran’s official behaviour towards the Ahwaz region.
First, Iran is one of the most controversial countries in the Middle East in general; bordered to the west by Ahwaz, Iraq and the Arabic Gulf states, it also borders some 15 other countries, making decision-making on foreign policy a complex and multifaceted process. (4)
That state has been a strong regional player since the beginning of the second period in the Pahlavi era, under the mandate of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, whose alliances and animosities, ranged across multiple fronts. After the Islamic revolution of 1979, Iran’s regional ambitions emerged through its expansionist strategies and the pursuit of regional hegemony.
Tehran has pursued an active foreign policy, forming many alliances with regional states or with the inner circles and upper echelons controlling these states to achieve the objectives of its revolution, primary among which is to ‘export’ the revolution to neighbouring countries, and to attempt to spread its doctrinal sectarian principles. This has become increasingly clear through the emergence of what the Iranian leadership calls the ‘Iranian project’ across the region, which has become a source of grave danger to the region’s security and stability. (5)
Iran’s leadership believes that the state’s regional actions and growing interests in neighbouring Arab states are entrenching its political and security role in the region and even increasing its strategic importance in the global order. As such, Tehran is determined to advance this regional involvement further.
Iranian foreign policy is complex and multifaceted; ambiguity and vagueness surround many aspects of the state’s foreign policy, with religious and sectarian doctrine inextricably intertwined with revolutionary and ultra-nationalist themes, all pursued with a degree of pragmatism in pursuit of attaining the desired objectives. The regime’s foreign policy differs from that of other states in terms of determinants, dimensions, objectives, development, distribution of roles, and a high level of evasiveness. These characteristics are reflected in the character of Iranian policy towards the Arab region. (6)
The ‘Iranian Constitution’ is the primary and main feature guiding and shaping Iran’s foreign policy, both in general terms and in specific relation to the Arab region and the wider Middle East; this is seen in several articles of the constitution, including article 152, which decides the general course of Iran’s foreign policy. In Item 16 of the third article, the duties of the government of Iran vis-à-vis foreign policy are defined as being to “regulate the country’s foreign policy on the basis of Islamic standards and fraternal obligations towards all Muslims and of the full protection of the vulnerable of the world.”
Analysis of this constitutional item clearly shows that Iran will pursue an interventionist policy in every country where there is any Shiite population under the pretext of ‘protecting the vulnerable’. Since there is a Shiite minority in all the Arab Gulf states as might be expected in Iran’s closest neighbouring nations, the Iranian state uses this doctrinal obligation to protect the vulnerable as an excuse to intervene in those states’ internal affairs. (7)
In the preamble to the same constitution, a section headed ‘The Ideological Army’ states of Iran’s armed forces that: “These armed forces are not only responsible for protecting and guarding the borders, but they bear the burdens of their divine mission: the jihad for the sake of Allah and the struggle to spread the provisions of the divine law in the world.” The divine law cited is that of the Islamic Republic’s governing doctrine of hardline Twelver Shiism, of which Iran’s Supreme Leader is the global figurehead. Based on this doctrine, undermining the security of the entire, Sunni-majority, Arab and Islamic neighbourhood is a primary goal of the Iranian state in order to attain its objective. (8)
The principle of ‘exporting the revolution’ has been the primary foreign policy priority for Iran’s regime since the Islamic Revolution, particularly in the Arab region and the wider Middle East. Since 1979, the regime’s foreign policy has been based on religious and sectarian doctrine and reliant on a strategy of escalating sectarian tensions and fomenting divisions, as happened in Iraq. (9)
The principle of ‘national interest’ is the other primary driver of Iran’s foreign policy, with the state exploiting its strategic and economic position as the world’s second-largest oil exporter as a policy tool to serve and preserve its interests. This is followed by the principle of strengthening Iran’s power and regional influence through seeking to dominate and control the Middle East and impose its leadership on the Arab region, as well as to control and influence the region’s crucial waterways, and to control the Shiite minorities worldwide. (10)
Iran’s foreign policies rely heavily on the strategic use of its geographical location in a crucial and privileged position that gives it access to the major regional seas, allowing it partial or full control of vitally important waterways. Tensions over control of these waterways have had a significant impact on the nature of Iran’s relations with the Gulf states. Iran has also worked to create a robust naval presence through building military bases on its coasts.
Iran’s historical power is another crucial factor in shaping the state’s contemporary foreign policy, with Iranian culture centred on pride in its imperialist historical status. This glorification of Iran’s imperial history goes hand-in-hand with geographical factors in shaping the regime’s policy towards the Arab region; under successive rulers and regimes, Iran has adopted an imperious and supremacist attitude towards Arab peoples borne of this carefully nurtured collective memory of the millennia-old period of imperial triumphalism during which the Persian Empire occupied and ruled over some Arab states; the empire is infamous for its passion for expansionism, domination and military rule.
The crucial demographic component of Iran’s expansionist drive is a reflection of the multiethnic nature of Iranian society; the political authority of Iran’s rulers past and present has been based on the principle of external expansion through attaining hegemonic control over non-Persian minorities. Tehran has also encouraged and exploited the presence of some Iranian communities in Iraq and the Arab Gulf states, many of whom emigrated to these nations on economic grounds. The regime and its predecessors have actively encouraged emigration to these nations by various means since the 19th century, continuing this policy on a significant scale until after the first half of the 20th century. (11)
The ideological pillar: This is considered the central determining factor in Iran’s foreign policy, with the regime exploiting Shiite doctrine to infiltrate Arab states where it depicts the predominantly Sunni Islamic doctrine followed by the peoples there as part of an ‘Arabisation project’, promoting a hostile characterisation of Arabs, particularly Sunnis, as cultural, historical and economic rivals. In areas outside this region, meanwhile, Iran exploits the emotions of the local Shiite populations and tries to increase their loyalties to Tehran through promoting strongly sectarian discourse. (12)
The nature of the Iranian project in the Arab region indicates the diversity of the plans and strategies used by the leaders in Tehran to achieve this regional expansionist project; it should be emphasised that the project itself predates the current regime, beginning in its modern iteration with the Pahlavi dynasty’s occupation of the autonomous emirate of Ahwaz and of three Emirati islands in the early decades of the twentieth century. (13)
Tehran has not hidden the objective and intention of its military, political and security activities targeting Arab countries in general, with a number of senior Iranian state officials openly talking about Iran’s expansionist objectives. Perhaps the most explicit and transparent statement in recent years was made by Ali Younesi, advisor to Iranian president Hassan Rouhani, when he said in 2015: “The whole Middle East region belongs to Iran; today the Iranian empire has become real, with its capital in Baghdad, and it is the centre of our civilisation, culture and identity as it was in the past. And the peoples neighbouring Iran are originally Iranians and separated from the Iranian Empire.” (14)
The deputy commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, Hossein Salami also clearly confirmed the Iranian expansionist strategy in 2016 when he said: “Iran’s security borders have expanded to the Mediterranean Sea, and all attempts by Iran’s enemies to stop our movement have failed.” (15)
In order for Tehran to achieve its goals, it established a 50-year plan, through which it seeks to control all the Arab states in five stages, each taking 10 years.
According to this plan, the pillars of the state’s leadership depend on three factors: the authority resting in the hands of the state, the scientific achievements and knowledge of scientists, and the economy and wealth of traders and capitalists. (16)
Iran’s plan is to undermine these three pillars in the Arab states through incitement and sedition among these parties, infiltrating governments via undercover agents, provoking scholars and clerics to turn against their governments, building Shiite mosques (Husseiniyas), buying homes and property, and establishing political parties, spy cells and militias.
Tehran is also using its proxy militias to open a land route extending from Iran through Iraq, Syria and Lebanon to the Mediterranean Sea, as part of a planned ‘corridor’ to provide another means of achieving its expansionist goals in the Arab region.
Iran has already been able to dominate some Arab states and has made major incursions into some others, helped by several factors, the most important of which is the double standards of the international community in dealing with regional crises, and the absence of any unified Arab project to confront the challenges and dangers plaguing the region.
The significance of Iran’s non-Persian minorities, who collectively account for around 70% of Iran’s total population, in particular, the Ahwazi people, has been widely ignored, despite the fact that this is Iran’s most important weakness, and a vital one in deterring Iran’s dangerous regional expansion. (18)
Second: There is a real problem in the Iranian imperialist mentality in dealings with neighbouring states, the Gulf in particular and the Arabs in general. Despite the passage of centuries and the frequent change in rulers, Iranian culture has perpetuated a caricatured image of hostile primitive Arabs – contrasting this unfavourably with urbane ‘sophisticated’ Persians – since pre-Islamic times and up to the present day.
Despite the superficial nature of the cultural differences between ethnically Persian and Arab peoples, the perpetuation and normalisation of this crude anti-Arab racism mean that this supremacist bigotry is deeply engrained within the Persian psyche, being passed down from generation to generation despite the passage of centuries.
This attitude disregards the reality of the conditions in these Arab states, especially the Gulf ones, which are more advanced than Iran on many levels; the intensity of this supremacism and bigotry and the accompanying arrogance makes it impossible for Iran to acknowledge this, meaning that this racist viewpoint continues to be the norm rather than the exception amongst Iranians and to shape the leadership’s strategy towards these nations, resulting in deeply flawed policies based on regressive, ultra-nationalist prejudices. (19)
The image of Arabs presented modern Persian literature appears to be that of a negative cypher, an ‘other’ to further elevate the self-image of Iranians; the concept of ‘Iranianism’ is a hotly debated literary theme in Iran and even a political and social issue generating concern that’s reflected in Iranian literature as a problem of a search for historical, cultural and national identity. Iranian writers of modern literature have portrayed Iran as a homogenous nation, defining Arabs simply as a negative ‘other’, the opposite of positive Iranian selfhood in terms of being racially, religiously linguistically, culturally or historically deficient; this endeavour to define ‘Iranianism’ played a crucial part in the creation of Iranian nationalism in the 20th century. (20)
Iranian nationalism is a consistent theme in modern Farsi literature noticed through the description of social history, local colour, customs, dialects, and so on. Nationalism means loyalty and devotion to the nation. According to Shahrokh Meskoob, since the advent of Islam in Iran, Iranian national consciousness has been founded on Persian language and pre-Islamic history, given the historical and linguistic factors. Based on these perceptions, Iran has been defined as a homogenous nation sharing a common language and history; in reality, Iran is a country of vast ethnic diversity, with Azeri Turks, Turkmens, Caspians (Tabari), Kurds, Arabs, Loris, Balochis. All these groups are culturally distinct, with each having its own language and culture that distinguish them to a greater or lesser degree from other groups in Iran. It should also be remembered that the provinces of Khuzestan, Bushehr and Bandar Abbas (Ahwaz – Arabistan) and Gilan and Mazandaran (Caspian) had practically enjoyed independence before 1919.
At the beginning of the movement for modern national consciousness, secular intellectuals sought to establish a new definition of the Iranianism concept, one built on the ruins of the pre-Islamic past. Some of these figures portrayed Iran in ancient history as being a superior advanced and sophisticated civilisation of Sassanids and Achaemenids whose flourishing civilisation was destroyed by ‘barbaric nomads’. Many of these figures deemed Islam a strange religion forced on ‘the noble Aryan nation’ by a ‘Semitic’ nation, specifically “a handful of lizard-eaters, barefoot naked Bedouins living in the desert. They are the savage Arabs.” (21)
There are many similar offensive negative stereotypes about the image of Arabs in Iran found throughout contemporary or historic Iranian culture. The ‘Shahnameh’ epic poem by the celebrated Persian poet Ferdowsi ends with the arrival of Muslim Arabs and the elimination and occupation of Sassanid Iran, with Arabs portrayed throughout as less civilised and less wealthy than the Iranians.
This recurring image of the poor, uncivilised Arab contrasted with the wealthy, sophisticated and civilised Iranian has been a staple of Persian culture for centuries, with the renowned 11th-century traveller and writer Nasir Khusraw featuring this familiarly insulting caricature in his classic ‘Safarnameh’.
This age-old bigotry became state policy in the 20th century under the rule of Reza Pahlavi, whose cruel policies centred on subjugating non-Persian peoples, using brutal military force in his efforts enforce assimilation. His troops forced men and women to don European clothing and headgear instead of the distinctive traditional clothing of their own ethnic groups. Reza Khan, who later became “Reza Shah Pahlavi”, also banned the use of the Islamic lunar calendar, which he replaced with the solar calendar.
The Pahlavi regime glorified Pre-Islamic Iran, and Muslim Arabs were cursed for supposedly causing Iran to decline from pre-Islamic greatness. The Pahlavi dynasty sought to change the ethnic identity of non-Persian peoples in Iran, with the goal of enforced homogensation to build a modern Iranian nation, ironically through dynastic monarchy, pursuing a policy of enforced ‘Persianisation’ which also included language reforms that banned the Arab population from being educated in or publicly speaking their own, Arabic, mother tongue. (22)
The ruling system changed again in the 1970s and 1980s, with Westerners replacing or at least outranking Arabs as the primary cultural figure of hatred contrasted with the more civilised Iranian ‘self’; with the establishment of the Islamic Republic, the regime’s hardline Twelver Shiite Islam was incorporated into Iran’s cultural identity.
The dilemma of the historical conflict between the Persians and the Arabs is strongly reflected in the systemic Iranian racism towards the citizens of the Ahwaz region, with this hostility dating back almost a century to the days of Shah Reza.
After the Persians occupied what was formerly the autonomous emirate of Ahwaz in what’s now south and southwestern, they immediately implemented several brutal discriminatory policies, including the forced displacement of thousands of Ahwazis to remote areas of northern cities; as well as being driven from their ancestral lands, the Ahwazis were prohibited from wearing Arab attire or speaking their native Arabic language.
These racist anti-Arab policies towards the Arab population continued, with the names of cities, towns, villages, rivers and geographical landmarks given new Farsi names to replace their Arabic names in an effort to obliterate the region’s Arab identity and character and effectively to rewrite history denying Ahwaz its Arab culture, heritage or existence. In the period after 1979 revolution, the Ahwazi people’s brief hope of finally attaining freedom and justice was cruelly dashed when the first Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, ordered a horrific massacre of protesters in the city of Muhammarah that subsequently became known as the ‘Black Wednesday Massacre’. This was followed by other mass killings and arrests of Ahwazi demonstrators in other towns, cities and villages across Ahwaz by Khomeini’s forces. (23)
Iran has continued its persecution of Ahwazis up to the present day, with an incident in 2016 showing typical racism when the second state TV channel featured a children’s programme entitled ‘Kolah Ghermez’ (‘The One with the Red Hat’) for the Nowruz Iranian New Year festival in which children from all Iran’s different ethnic groups were recognized, with the deliberate exception of Arabs. (24)
While this incident was typical rather than being unusual, it caused widespread anger in Ahwaz due to being the latest in a long series of provocative anti-Arab slights by Iranian state media, also including TV news reports and newspaper articles, drama series and official government proclamations, all of which set out to deny the Arab presence in Ahwaz.
Prior to this in 1985, the Iranian government’s Etelaat newspaper referred to the indigenous Ahwazi people as “nomadic Gypsies” and “immigrants”, sparking a popular uprising across Ahwaz that became known as the Dignity Uprising.
According to research, the reason for this intense hostility towards Ahwazis dates back centuries to the seventh century Battle of Qadisiyyah on November 16-19 in the year 636 AD when Arab forces defeated the Persian army. Despite the passage of over 1360 years since then and the fact that Ahwazis weren’t even involved in this battle, they are targeted and subjected to daily persecution and injustice by the regime as though they personally ordered the battle, as well as being subjected to the regime’s ‘Persianisation’ policy.
Like other ethnic minorities, Ahwazis are forbidden to wear their traditional Arab attire in government departments, or to learn in Arabic. As well as seeing the names of their cities, towns and villages and even the streets and neighbourhoods changed from Arabic to Farsi, Ahwazis are prevented from completing their post-graduate studies or from attaining leadership or judicial positions, except in rare cases where zealous loyalty to the regime may be rewarded with a regime post.
The unemployment rate in some of the cities of Ahwaz has risen to around 70 per cent, along with the construction of dozens of dams and the drying of the once renowned rivers and marshlands, which resulted in an environmental crisis and the spread of diseases. The dam projects aim to divert rivers in this region to Iranian cities with a majority Persian population, with the aim of creating a kind of demographic change. “(25)
The racist policies towards Ahwazis also include the settlement of the different ethnic Lur community that is difficult to integrate with the Arabs. This is similar to the policies of Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, the former Shah of Iran, when he brought the Yazidis of the Iranian city of Yazd. They were Arabised and merged with the Arabs, which eventually failed.
Racism of Tehran regime is reflected clearly toward the Ahwazi , where hundreds of their religious imams and political activists have been executed, and many of them have been exiled to cities with a Persian majority.
The Iranian regime tried to accuse them of belonging to extremist organisations in order to suppress and kill them, as well as the oppression of the Ahwazi Sabian Mandaeans as Arabs and non-Muslims and depriving them of their rights. According to the Iranian constitution, the blood money of a Sabian is a quarter of a Mulsim’s.
Persian racism transcends the “Nazism” regime, according to a study carried out at the end of 2016, Iran ranked second in the world in racism, preceded by only India. This is according to a survey including 80 states conducted by a group of Swedish researchers to know the states’ dealing with diverse ethnicities within their population. (26)
Margins and References:
- This incident dates back to the 16th century when the island of Bahrain was ruled by the Safavid Empire, however the ruling family of Bahrain took over the island since 1820. In 1957, Shah Raza Pahlavi led the Parliament to discuss measures to seize Bahrain, and he noted the possibility of renewing Iranian claims to the Gulf kingdom following the British withdrawal from east of Suez. However, a popular referendum in 1971 decided to establish Bahrain as an independent state without opposition from the Shah or the Iranian parliament. The referendum came after talks with Britain, which began to arrange for its withdrawal from the Arabian Gulf in the 1960s, London-based Al-Arab newspaper, 28/7/2018 issue.
- The previous source, the same date of the mentioned issue.
- Al-Tadakhul men Wejhat Nazr Al-Qanoun Al-Dawli ela Ardh Al-Waqe` (Intervention from the Point of View of International Law to the Reality), Addiyar website, November 2013, available at the following link:
- Al-Siyasah Al-Kharejiyah Al-Iraniyah (Iranian Foreign Policy), available at:
- Same as previous source.
- Same as previous source.
- Ibrahim Al-Fakher, Al-Mashrou` Al-Irani was Adwatuhu Al-Estratijiyyah (Iranian Project and Its Strategic Tools), Almezmaah Center for Studies and Research, February 2014:
- Alaa Mohammed Al-Abd Matar, Aydlujiat Al-Thawrat Al-Iirania was Atharaha `ala Al-Tawajuhat Al-Siyasa Al-Kharijia Al-Iirania Tejah Dual Al-Khalij Al-Arabi (The Ideology of the Iranian Revolution and its Impact on Iranian Foreign Policy Towards the Arab Gulf States) (1979-2003), master thesis, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo, 2004, p 20.
- Abdullah Fahad Al-Nefisi, Al-Mashrou` Al-Irani fi Al-Mentaqah Al-Arabiyah wa Al-Islamiyah (The Iranian Project in the Arab and Islamic Region), Dar Ammar Publishing & Distribution, Amman, 2014.
- Previous source.
- Mustafa Al-Labbad, Qera’ah fi Mashrou` Iran Tejah Mentaqah Al-Arabiyah (A Reading in Iran’s Strategic Project Towards the Arab Region,) Arab Affairs magazine, issue No. 129, 2007, p 36
- Same as previous source.
- The three UAE islands are three strategic islands located eastern of the Arabian Gulf, and while the UAE says it is part of its territory and demands that Iran, which has been in control over them since 1971, return them, Tehran asserts that its ownership of the islands is “indisputable.” They were seized by Iran on November 30, 1971, days after the withdrawal of the British colonial forces, and two days before the independence of the UAE from Britain, and was inhabited by about 300 people living on fishing and grazing livestock. Despite the small size of the three islands, but they overlook the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 40% of the world production of oil passes every day, and which linking the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Gulf, the main crossing to the Indian Ocean. The one who controls these islands would control the water traffic in the Arabian Gulf, available at the following link:
- Iranian Students’ News Agency (ISNA), March 2015, available at:
- Azad News Agency (ANA), 14/8/2017, is available at the following link:
- Hassan Radhi, Mashrou` Iran Al-Tawasu`I .. men “Al- Anaconda” ela “Al-Corridor” (Iran’s expansionist project, from Anaconda to Corridor), Sky News Arabia, November 26, 2017, available link:
- Mamar “Iran-Al-Iraq-Soriya” Tahat Al-Tanfeeth fi Entezar Al-E`lan Al-Rasmi (“Iran-Iraq-Syria” Corridor under Implementation Awaiting Official Announcement, Al-Ain News portal, 8/4/2018, available link:
- Mashrou` Iran Al-Tawasu`I .. men “Al- Anaconda” ela “Al-Corridor”, a previous source.
- Mohammed Alsulami, Al-`aqliyah Al-este`la’iyah Taqoud Estratijiyat Tehran Tejah Al-Mentaqa (Supremacist Mentality Leads Tehran’s Strategy to the Region), Middle East, October 1, 2018, available link:
20, 21, 22. The Image of Arabs in Modern Persian Literature, by: Joya Blondel Saad, Translated by Sakhr Al-Haj Hussein, Publisher: Dar Qadmos – Damascus, Beirut 2007, pp. 160 to170.
- Al-Arab … `Oqoud Al`Onsoriyah “Decades of Racism” in Iran, Hisham Rashad Abdul-Rahman, Democratic Arabic Center for Strategic, Political and Economic Studies, March 29, 2018, available at the following link:
- Iranian Opposition Member Tells Al-Ain News portal: Public Anger Against the Mullahs, Al-Ain News portal, April 22, 2018, available link:
- 26 Al-Arab … `Oqoud Al`Onsoriyah “Decades of Racism” in Iran, a previous source.